Executive Summary

Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity, with a Sunni majority and substantial minority populations, poses significant challenges to post-conflict governance. This fragmentation, along with ideological divides, has attracted foreign interventions, with external powers exploiting Syria’s strategic location. As of December 2024, Syria remains divided into six zones of control. HTS governs the largest territory, while the Kurdish-led SDF, supported by the U.S., controls the northeast. The Turkish-backed SNA controls the north, and other areas are controlled by various factions, including Russia, Iran-backed militias, and Hezbollah. Although ISIS has lost territorial control, it continues to pose an insurgent threat.

Backgrounder

Before 2011, around 70% of Syrians identified with clans or tribes, which became key power dynamics during the conflict. In regions like northeastern Syria’s Upper Mesopotamia, major tribes such as Jubur, Tayy, Bakara, Anazzah, and Shammar have shifted loyalties between regime forces, opposition factions, and the Kurdish-led self-administration. As control of the region fluctuated between the regime, opposition, and ISIS, clan affiliations adapted, leading to shifting allegiances and even intra-clan conflicts—unprecedented in the area. This tribal division continues to play a significant role in Syria’s fragmented conflict landscape.

Syria’s demographic composition is marked by significant ethnic and religious diversity. Around 70% of the population identifies as Sunni Muslim, with a notable concentration in the Idlib region, which has become the last opposition stronghold, controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and sheltering nearly 4 million displaced people, including Sunni Muslims, Christians, and Druze. The Sunni Muslim group encompasses various ethnicities, including Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, Chechens, and Turkmen. Alawites, Ismailis, and Shia Muslims make up approximately 13%, while Druze account for around 3%. Additionally, Syria’s population includes minority groups such as Kurds (10-15%), Christians (10%), and smaller ethnic communities like Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians, often concentrated around Damascus. This intricate ethnic and religious mosaic underscores the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and governance in a deeply fragmented society

Syria’s diverse demographics and ideological rifts have undermined its stability, creating openings for covert foreign intervention. Despite lacking significant resources or infrastructure, Syria’s strategic geopolitical position has attracted external powers prioritizing their own interests. As one analyst observed, “Syria lacks strategic minerals, major oil production, and significant seaports or military bases, but it possesses an enviable asset: location.” The escalating civil war led both pro- and anti-regime factions to rely heavily on external sponsors, turning Syria into a proxy battleground for regional geopolitical rivalries.

Strategic Analysis

Syria remains deeply fragmented, with six primary zones of control as of December 2024. HTS governs the largest territory, overtaking areas previously held by Kurdish groups. The Kurdish-led SDF, supported by U.S. forces, controls the northeast, while the Turkish-backed SNA holds the north and continues to clash with the SDF. South of Damascus, unidentified opposition groups operate, and Israeli forces maintain a foothold in the Golan Heights. Russia retains small territories near its bases, while the influence of Assad loyalists, Iran-backed militias, and Hezbollah remains ambiguous. The Islamic State persists as an insurgent threat but lacks territorial dominance.

.Chemistry of Internal Factions & External Forces

The Kurds : The Kurdish-ruled Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava), Jazira, Afrin serves as the hub for Syria’s largest minority, approximately 2.5 million Kurds. While most reside in the northeast, smaller Kurdish communities are present around Damascus. Within this minority, Yazidis—a distinct religious sect—are primarily concentrated in the Aleppo governorate. Additionally, esoteric Islamic sects, including some Kurds, inhabit Syria’s western coastal cities like Latakia and Tartus, reflecting the country’s intricate socio-religious landscape.

The Shammar tribe’s al-Sanadid Forces emerged as critical Arab allies of the Kurds in northern Syria, where Kurdish groups pursued de facto autonomy by navigating shifting alliances with Arab opposition forces. The 2014 ISIS siege of Kobani was a turning point, with Kurdish YPG forces—backed by U.S. arms and airstrikes—repelling ISIS. As the Kurds consolidated Rojava, they faced allegations of ethnic cleansing in mixed Arab-Kurd regions. The YPG’s ties to the PKK, labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey and the U.S., remain contentious. Formed in 2015, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a U.S.-backed coalition of Kurdish-led groups, Arabs, and minorities under the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)—became a key anti-ISIS force. The SDF controlled oil-rich regions and sought autonomy akin to Iraq’s Kurdish region. However, by late 2024, after capturing Deir al-Zour and key border crossings, the SDF lost significant ground to HTS and the SNA, underscoring its fragile position in post-Assad Syria.

Christians: Syria’s religious diversity extends beyond its various Muslim sects to include Christian minorities, with denominations such as Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Maronite, and several Catholic traditions. Beyond Shiite militias like Hezbollah and Iranian-backed proxies, the conflict has also involved Christian militias, particularly in Wadi al-Nasara (between Homs and Tartus.)

The ancient Christian town of Maaloula, known for its Aramaic-speaking population, is under threat from Islamist militants. As one of the world’s oldest Christian communities, Maaloula now faces potential extermination. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and local sources, opposition militants—previously expelled by the Assad regime—have returned, driven by vengeance against the Christian residents they blame for their displacement.

Ismaili: The Syrian Jamat, the world’s oldest Ismaili community, highlights Syria’s complex armed factions. In Salamiyah, Ismaili militias reflect this diversity, but the Ismaili Council has chosen neutrality, refusing to take arms against Syrians. A peaceful agreement, brokered by Prince Karim Aga Khan, ensured Syrian opposition forces would protect Salamiyah without conflict.

Southern Operations Room: The Southern Operations Room (SOR), formed on December 6, 2024, seeks to unify Syria while maintaining state institutions. Following the withdrawal of regime forces, the SOR launched an offensive, capturing Daraa and Quneitra, which led Israel to reinforce the Golan Heights. Key factions include the 8th Brigade, formerly the “Youth of Sunna Forces,” which reconciled with Russia in 2018, retained arms, and later joined Russian-led operations. Leaders like Nassim Abu Ara and Ahmad Awda, the latter closely linked to Moscow, play pivotal roles. Though not formally aligned with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the SOR collaborates with HTS, particularly in rural Daraa, where the 8th Brigade shields HTS members who target drug traffickers and Islamic State (IS) affiliates, reflecting a pragmatic alliance.

The Druze: A Druze rebel group founded in 2014 by Sheikh Wahid al-Balous in Suwayda Province has become the largest Druze organization in southern Syria. Initially focused on protecting Druze communities, it opposed Assad, Iranian militias, Hezbollah, ISIS, and other rebel factions, occasionally collaborating with the regime. Led by Sheikh Yahya Al-Hajjar, the group has remained neutral avoiding formal alliance with factions like Free Syrian army(FSA)l until recently, intensifying actions against the regime and joining the Southern Operations Room (SOR). Its influence, backed by Druze fighters, contributed to the regime’s collapse in southern Syria, with key cities like Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra falling and surrounding Damascus. After the 2018 reconciliation, some joined the Russian-backed 8th Brigade, while others formed smaller resistance units. The group’s legacy, especially in fighting ISIS in southwest Daraa, could significantly impact future developments if ISIS resurges.

Israel: Israel and Syria have technically been at war since 1948, clashing in major conflicts including the Arab-Israeli wars and during the Lebanese Civil War. Syria, which does not recognize Israel, lost the Golan Heights in 1967, later annexed by Israel in 1980, with plans for expanded settlements announced recently. During Syria’s civil war, Israel avoided direct confrontation with Assad’s forces but launched airstrikes targeting Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Around 50,000 people live in the Golan Heights, split between Israeli settlers and Arab Druze, who maintain ties to Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. Many Druze consider themselves Syrians under occupation, holding Israeli residency but not citizenship. After Assad’s departure, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu extended a peace offer to Syria’s Druze, echoing Israel’s past efforts to establish a Druze state as a buffer. Israel has mandatory military service for Druze since 1952, strengthening ties through the Israeli army. Despite the international community viewing the Golan as occupied Syrian territory, the U.S. recognized Israel’s annexation in 2019. Arab states, Iran, and Turkey condemn Israeli actions, while Israel criticizes Turkey’s attacks on Kurdish forces and advocates for protection of those who fought ISIS.

Israel has conducted numerous airstrikes on Syrian military infrastructure and increased its occupation across southern Syria, reaching key locations like the Al-Mantara Dam in the Quneitra countryside. Israel’s control now extends to six of the most strategic water bodies in southern Syria, including the Al-Wahda Dam, located on the Jordanian border. These actions have placed Israel in control of roughly 30% of Syria’s water supply and 40% of Jordan’s, creating a significant regional security risk, particularly for Jordan, which heavily relies on the Al-Wahda Dam. This territorial expansion underscores Israel’s strategic interest in vital resources amid Syria’s fragmentation.

IRAN: Syria has been Iran’s key strategic hub in the region, acting almost like a province under Tehran’s control. Iran utilized Syrian territory for military bases, missile factories, and supply routes, enabling it to support its network of militants, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and other groups in the West Bank and Iraq, by funneling weapons, cash, and logistical aid. Iran has deeply embedded itself in Syria’s military framework, shaping the National Defense Forces (NDF) under IRGC guidance to bolster Assad’s overstretched army with local fighters. It established strong ties with elite units like the 4th Armored Division, led by Maher al-Assad, and the Republican Guard, providing extensive training, weapons, and funding. These units played pivotal roles, with the 4th Division leading offensives and the Republican Guard safeguarding key regime assets. Iran invested over $30 billion in Assad’s survival during the civil war, supplying subsidized oil and resources. To secure its land corridor to Hezbollah, Iran deployed militia fighters, including Hezbollah troops, enduring significant losses among IRGC and Basij forces.

Deir al-Zor has been pivotal for Iran, which built military bases and tribal alliances by exploiting Arab discontent with ISIS and later the SDF. The region became central to the U.S.-Iran rivalry, with Iranian militias targeting U.S. positions. Following Assad’s weakening grip, Iran ceded control to the SDF, likely as a calculated move. Tehran may anticipate that tensions among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkish-backed rebels will eventually restore opportunities for influence. Furthermore, Iran’s collaboration with Sunni groups could yield pragmatic alliances against Israel, especially after Israel’s control of the southern demilitarized zone.

Russia: Over the past decade, Russia has solidified its military presence in Syria, with permanent bases at Tartus and Khmeimim, though some forces were redeployed to Ukraine by 2024. This foothold enabled Russian influence in Africa, Libya, and the Sahel, along with control over Mediterranean and Red Sea access, strengthening leverage against NATO’s southern flank. Russia’s 2015 intervention supported Assad, targeting ISIS and U.S.-backed rebels, while using diplomatic influence to veto UN actions and build ties with Iran, Israel, Gulf states, and Türkiye, all while promoting a post-Assad government under the banner of Syrian self-determination. Moscow will need to reassess its strategies, largely contingent on HTS’s position. Some Russian media reports suggest that Russia is negotiating with HTS leaders to maintain its Syrian military bases. Notably, HTS has not yet formally requested Moscow’s withdrawal.

US: The U.S. initially struggled with Syria’s upheaval but adopted a cautious strategy, acknowledging Assad’s weakening power. The Biden administration considered potential engagement with HTS, despite its terrorist designation. While avoiding direct involvement in Assad’s ousting, the U.S. maintains a strong presence through troops, sanctions, and coordination with Israel. With 900 troops in the northeast, the U.S. collaborates with the SDF to counter ISIS and secure oil fields, which are controlled by Kurdish forces, complicating relations with Turkey. U.S. airstrikes targeted ISIS after Assad’s fall, but Turkish opposition to the SDF prompted U.S. mediation between Turkey and Kurdish groups. Many observers link the fall of Assad to U.S. influence, noting that HTS was never targeted by the U.S. or Israel, even amid numerous airstrikes in Syria. Interestingly, HTS has not opposed Israel’s actions, including incursions into the Golan Heights.

The U.S. garrison at al-Tanf, on the Syrian-Iraqi border, has been a key base for counter-ISIS operations and training opposition forces since 2016. Its proximity to the Baghdad-Damascus highway makes it a point of contention with Iranian and Iran-backed forces. Despite reducing support for rebel factions, the U.S. remains committed to holding the base due to its strategic importance. U.S. withdrawal from al-Tanf is unlikely without broader negotiations, maintaining the 55-km de-confliction zone as a buffer.

Palestine: During the Lebanese Civil War and beyond, the Assad regime’s fraught relations with the PLO led to violent clashes, including the brutal War of the Camps (1985–1988), where Syrian forces and allies besieged Palestinian camps in Lebanon, killing thousands. Efforts to dominate Palestinian factions aimed to prevent Israeli intervention. Later, Hamas severed ties with Assad, supporting the Syrian uprising, while its aligned group, Aknaf Bait al-Maqdis, clashed with regime forces and ISIS. Over the past 13 years, the regime systematically destroyed Palestinian camps in Syria, targeting communities that resisted its rule.

Ambiguity over the new Syrian leadership’s stance on Israel is concerning. Since Assad’s fall, Israel has expanded in the Golan Heights, seizing key areas and planning a buffer zone. Palestinian factions, supported by Turkey-based opposition groups, have reaffirmed resistance and operations in Syria. Meanwhile, Western nations, led by the U.S., are pressuring Syria’s leadership to avoid confronting Israel, leveraging sanctions and the HTS terror designation to limit recovery and reconstruction. The U.S. also exerts influence through military presence and by pressuring regional allies like Jordan and Gulf states to curb opposition to Israeli expansion.

Assad’s fall ends Hamas’s complex relationship with the regime. After initially backing the 2011 uprising, Hamas lost its Damascus base and strained ties with Iran and Hezbollah. While relations later improved, Hezbollah’s hesitant support during the Gaza conflict signals a weakening “axis of resistance.” Syria’s civil war has deepened Palestinian divisions, with pro- and anti-regime factions clashing. Post-Assad, the fate of Palestinian refugees in Syria and displaced abroad will influence both intra-Palestinian politics and international responses.

Jordan: Assad’s departure offers a chance to address Syria’s narco-state legacy, particularly Captagon trafficking through Jordan to the Gulf, linked to Maher al-Assad’s fourth armored division. Jordan anticipates that al-Sharaa’s regime will curb this trade and focus on enhancing border security, especially along the eastern desert frontier.

Iraq: After 2003, Assad’s regime facilitated the flow of suicide bombers into Iraq, causing significant casualties among Iraqis and U.S. troops. ISIS exploited shared territory across Iraq and Syria as a unified battleground. Iraqi Shia groups bolstered Assad during Syria’s revolution, while Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, fought in Iraq with al-Qaida and was detained at the U.S. military’s Camp Bucca.

The unexpected collapse of the Assad regime unsettled Iraq and its Iran-aligned factions in Syria. As HTS gained ground, Baghdad bolstered its 600km border, likening the offensive to ISIS’s 2014 rise. Despite HTS leader al-Sharaa’s assurances of peaceful intent, Iraq remained wary. Under pressure from Iran-backed factions, Prime Minister Sudani refrained from direct intervention but permitted groups like Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba to act autonomously. By December, as Syrian forces retreated, Iraqi factions, coordinating with Iran, also withdrew, leaving eastern Syria under SDF control.

Since the rebel capture of Damascus, Iraq has adopted a cautious but flexible stance toward the new leadership. While Iraq acknowledges HTS’s promise to protect Shiite holy sites, it remains wary of a potential civil war in Syria. Although Iraqis are relieved by Iran’s reduced influence post-Assad, they fear Tehran may increase its grip on Iraq. Iran faces a choice between tightening control, easing influence for regional realignment, or maintaining the current stability. U.S.-Iran dynamics will impact Iraq, which now seeks U.S. support not only against ISIS but also to prevent Israeli attacks.

Turkish: The Syrian National Army (SNA), backed by Turkey, emerged during the 2016 Euphrates Shield operation against ISIS and became central to Ankara’s campaign against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), linked to the PKK. Formed in 2017, the SNA operates along Syria’s northern border, targeting Assad’s regime, ISIS, and the YPG, a key SDF faction. Turkey, hosting 3.5 million refugees, seeks stability for their return but also aims to consolidate control over northern Syria through its “security zone,” partnered with the SNA. The ongoing conflict underscores regional instability and Ankara’s strategic ambitions post-Assad.

In November 2024, the SNA allied with HTS in an offensive on Aleppo, targeting both Assad’s forces and the SDF. A U.S.-mediated ceasefire with the SDF followed in Manbij, highlighting Turkey’s role in shaping northern Syria. Ankara’s backing of the SNA aligns with its goals to counter ISIS, curb Kurdish influence, and facilitate refugee returns, with Turkish companies spearheading reconstruction. Turkey also mediates among rebel factions, urging HTS to share power with the SNA. Ankara’s strategic focus remains on preventing a PKK-linked entity in Syria’s northeast while addressing border security. Its stance on HTS reflects concerns over Kurdish militancy, with the outcome heavily influenced by U.S. actions and HTS cooperation.

Gulf Arab: Gulf Arab states aim to stabilize Syria, safeguard state institutions, and prevent jihadist threats to neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Initially supporting opposition groups, they shifted toward normalizing relations with Assad after failed attempts to oust him, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE facilitating Syria’s 2023 Arab League return. Their strategy involves using political and economic incentives to distance Assad from Iran. While Qatar and Kuwait continued supporting opposition, Oman maintained ties with Damascus. Gulf states prioritize Syrian unity, security, and humanitarian aid, with Qatar leading relief efforts, while also viewing Syria’s recovery as key to limiting Iranian influence.

Libya: Assad’s downfall exposed Libya’s political divisions, with Dabaiba’s supporters in Tripoli celebrating, while Haftar’s base in Benghazi remained subdued. Haftar, supported by Russia, has long relied on Syrian military backing, and Assad’s ousting is seen as a warning to Libya’s autocratic factions. Haftar’s allies now criticize Syria’s new Islamist rulers, highlighting Libya’s internal rifts. The event may revive political talks in Libya, though factions may delay negotiations to solidify their positions. Russia’s influence in Libya could be affected by its ability to retain military bases in Syria, potentially altering its regional and African presence.

HTS: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a militant Islamist group in Syria, played a pivotal role in toppling Assad in 2024, ending his 50-year rule. Formed in 2017 from various rebel factions, including the al-Qaeda-linked Nusrah Front, HTS has focused on paramilitary operations against Assad’s regime. Despite rejecting jihad against the West and not engaging in international terrorism, its past ties to al-Qaeda have led to its designation as a terrorist group by the U.S., UK, Turkey, and the EU. HTS has dominated northwest Syria since 2017, consolidating control over Idlib by eliminating or absorbing rival factions, including Hurras al-Din and Ahrar al-Sham, and clashing with Turkish-backed forces.

Hezbollah: Syria has long influenced Lebanese politics, intervening in the civil war (1975–1990) and maintaining dominance until its 2005 withdrawal. Despite its exit, Assad’s regime leveraged Hezbollah, displaced Syrians, and political divisions to retain sway. Assad’s fall threatens Hezbollah’s strategic depth and arms routes from Iran, compounding challenges from its recent war with Israel and heavy losses in Syria. Lebanon’s response reflects deep divides over Hezbollah’s political role and alignment with the Iran-led “axis of resistance.” Framing Syria’s crisis as a “Zionist-American plot,” Hezbollah leaders like Naim Qasem defend their stance as vital to countering Israeli aggression.

Hezbollah has voiced concerns over Syrian rebels’ “extremism,” citing the violent legacy of HTS’s predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, despite HTS’s claims of moderation. The Assad regime’s collapse, coupled with long-standing resentment over its role in Rafiq al-Hariri’s 2005 assassination and treatment of Lebanese detainees, has emboldened anti-Hezbollah factions, particularly among Christians and Sunnis, seeking to sever its supply lines. Hezbollah’s setbacks against Israel raise fears of destabilizing responses, including protests or assassinations, which could further deepen Lebanon’s instability.

Islamic State: The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011 as an uprising against President Bashar al-Assad, opened opportunities for AQI/ISI fighters to move into eastern Syria. ISIS established control in eastern Syria, centered in Al-Raqqah, enforcing strict Islamic law and using propaganda to attract global recruits. It funded operations by seizing and exploiting oil infrastructure, selling oil on the black market.

ISIS attacks in Syria tripled in 2024, exceeding 700, showing greater sophistication, lethality, and geographic spread. Since losing territory in 2019, ISIS remains active, with the U.S. and the Global Coalition closely monitoring its resurgence. By mid-2024, ISIS had around 2,500 active fighters and claimed 153 attacks in Syria and Iraq—double the previous year—nearly half targeting fuel convoys in eastern Syria. The SDF, already strained by Turkish-backed SNA offensives in Kobani and Manbij, faces additional unrest in Deir ez-Zor and Sunni Arab protests in Raqqa and al-Hasakah. The tenuous ceasefire with the SNA and potential loss of key areas like Kobani heighten the risk of ISIS exploiting these vulnerabilities.

Implications

Assad’s downfall would weaken Iran and Hezbollah’s influence, reducing sectarian tensions and their regional footprint. However, the resulting power vacuum could destabilize the region, heightening competition for control and enabling the rise of extremist factions. In response, Iran may shift its focus to strengthening proxy groups like the Houthis to maintain its regional leverage.

A stable Syria that curbs extremism would enhance Iraq’s security, but governance gaps, sectarian tensions, and the potential ISIS resurgence in Syria present major risks. The SDF’s tenuous control over al-Hol camp, with 17,000 Iraqis, and prisons housing ISIS fighters, heightens Iraq’s vulnerability along its 600-kilometer border. Baghdad stresses Syria’s territorial integrity while fearing an ISIS comeback, especially with the SDF focused on countering Turkish-backed forces. Iraq’s collaboration with the U.S.-led coalition in Syria provides stability amid regional uncertainties. With substantial financial resources, ISIS can rebuild, recruit, and target SDF-guarded prisons and camps in northeastern Syria.

The incoming Trump administration introduces uncertainty, given its past inclination to withdraw from Syria and focus on Türkiye’s role. U.S. sanctions on HTS hinder Syria’s recovery, with calls for broader relief to aid the transition. Regional pressures could push Washington to limit Israeli actions in Syria, complicating U.S. involvement in the crisis. Isolationist trends may lead to a reduction in U.S. engagement.

The brief unity among opposition groups, united by anti-regime sentiment, is unlikely to provide a durable solution for Syria’s crisis. The area’s strategic importance as a major arms smuggling route to Jordan and its proximity to the Golan Heights heighten security risks for both Jordan and Israel.

Forecast

• The Islamic State has leveraged central Syria’s desert terrain to target former regime forces and militias. With the regime’s collapse in these areas, ISIS is likely to exploit the security vacuum, potentially transforming the region into a conflict hotspot. This could spark clashes with HTS-led factions or southern opposition groups, echoing previous battles in Idlib, Daraa, and rural Damascus.
• Reports indicate that Russia is preparing to withdraw its military assets from Syria, with naval fleets moved offshore and key bases like Hmeimim being deactivated. Losing these bases would severely disrupt Russia’s logistical operations in Africa and further erode its Mediterranean presence, already strained by Turkey’s closure of the Turkish Straits, limiting Black Sea fleet access during the Ukraine conflict.
• Russia is likely to back the formation of an Alawite statelet along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, centered around its military bases and the Alawite minority’s ties to the Assad regime. Framing this as a counter to U.S. support for the Kurdish statelet, Moscow may use it as a strategic precedent. By granting asylum to allies like Bashar al-Assad, Russia reinforces its loyalty to aligned regimes while positioning itself to exploit Syria’s power vacuum and secure influence as a potential puppet power.
• Success by Syrian rebels could encourage Yemeni government forces to renew military actions against the Houthis, potentially reigniting conflict after a period of relative stability.
• Turkey aims to replace Iran’s influence in Syria by actively engaging with new players and is likely to take the lead in reconstruction efforts once the new leadership stabilizes. Turkey’s aid aligns with U.S. interests in western Syria, and collaboration with Jordan and Israel could advance shared goals.
• Iran’s collaboration with Sunni groups may create pragmatic alliances against Israel, particularly following Israel’s control of the southern demilitarized zone. Tehran expects that rising tensions among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkish-backed rebels could eventually reopen avenues for its influence.

Recommendations

• The policy makers should implement a strong regional strategy, coordinating multilateral diplomacy with Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and Jordan.
• By facilitating proactive mediation and encouraging dialogue between adversarial states, the international actors can help stabilize Syria, promote cooperative security, and drive regional peace and collaboration.
• Prioritizing Iran containment, Israeli security, and Lebanese stability could yield significant strategic gains and a potential Middle East peace legacy.
• Exercise caution in supporting any factions at this stage. Their fluid allegiances and uncertain commitments make long-term reliability doubtful, and backing one group risks entanglement in an unpredictable and volatile conflict.

Conclusion

Political fragmentation in Syria stems from both internal dynamics and external influences. Rebel groups, seeking support against a stronger adversary, often accept aid from external powers, who in turn use this support to exert influence and shape the opposition’s structure. This external patronage fosters independence within factions, weakening leadership and exacerbating divisions. The competition between patrons reflects broader struggles within Syria, with financial fragmentation contributing significantly to disunity. The irony lies in the fact that international actors now cite this fragmentation as justification for withholding further support. Lasting unity will remain difficult unless external actors work together to establish transparent and accountable financial support systems.