1/Executive summary:

This report analyses the recently implemented pact on active military disengagement along the decades long disputed Himalayan border between Indian & Government of China. It can be undoubtedly considered as the biggest defrost after a deadly clash between both the Armies 4 years ago in Galwan valley.

Both countries’ troops who were head-to-head at two points on the crucial frontier region in India’s Ladakh region in the western Himalayas had begun pulling back, an Indian government source said, beginning an end to the standoff. This disengagement process is completed by the end of October this year, as a senior Indian Army official said. In New Delhi, a government official aware of the details said troops on both sides had started withdrawing from the areas of Depsang and Demchok, the last remaining points where they had stood face-to-face.

The Indian army official said the returning troops would also remove structures such as huts and tents and take back vehicles they had brought to positions that existed before the conflict began in April 2020. The two forces can then resume patrolling along the frontier as they did before the stand-off, the official added.

2/Situation Overview:

–Location: Military disengagement across the Line of Actual Control (LAC)

–Timeframe: October 2024 – Present.

–Military forces Involved: Indian Army & Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

–Background: Relations between India and China had been worsening. The two world powers were facing off against each other along their disputed border in the Himalayan region. The primary & root cause is a vague-defined, 3,440km (2,100-mile)-long disputed border. Rivers, lakes and snowcaps along that particular frontier means the line can shift, bringing soldiers to clashes at many points, sparking a confrontation. The two nations are also competing to build infrastructure along the border, which is also known as the Line of Actual Control. India’s construction of a new road to a high-altitude air base is seen as one of the main triggers for a deadly 2020 clash with Chinese troops.

Galwan clash (2020): At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a clash with Chinese forces in a disputed Himalayan border area, Indian officials say. The incident follows rising tensions, and is the first deadly clash in the border area in at least 45 years.

Yangtse clash (2022): The Yangtse clash of 9 December 2022 occurred at night between the troops of the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along their mutually contested Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Yangtze region of Tawang in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Violent clashes ensued after the two armies confronted each other with nail-studded clubs and other melee weapons near positions on a border ridgeline in close vicinity of the revered Buddhist site of Chumi Gyatso Falls. The border incident marked the most serious clash between the two armies along their undemarcated frontier since the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020, which had led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of dead on the Chinese side.

Order of Battle Analysis:

Sino-Indian War (1962): A long series of events triggered the Sino-Indian War in 1962. According to John W. Garver, Chinese perceptions about the Indian designs for Tibet, and the failure to demarcate a common border between China and India (including the Indian Forward Policy) were important in China’s decision to fight a war with India.

After coming to power, the PRC announced that its army would be occupying Tibet. India sent a letter of protest to China proposing negotiations on the Tibet issue. In August 1950, China expressed its gratitude to India’s attempts to “stabilise the Indo-Chinese border”. To clear any doubts or ambiguities, Prime Minister Nehru stated in Parliament in 1950 that “Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary and that is our boundary…we stand by that boundary and we will not let anyone else come across that boundary“. China expressed no concerns at these statements.

Tibet disagreements:

“Be sharp, don’t fear to irritate him [Nehru], don’t fear to cause him trouble. Nehru miscalculated the situation believing that China could not suppress the rebellion in Tibet and would have to beg India’s help.”

— Mao Zedong addressing a Politburo Standing Committee

 

“Nehru and people from the Indian upper class oppose reform in Tibet, even to the extent of saying that reform is impossible… [They want] Tibet to remain for a long time in a backward state, becoming a ‘buffer state’ between China and India. This is their guiding mentality, and also the center of the Sino-Indian conflict.”

— Zhou Enlai

Border negotiations: China’s 1958 maps showed the large strip of Northeastern part of Jammu and Kashmir (the Aksai Chin) as Chinese. In 1960, Zhou Enlai proposed that India drop its claim to Aksai Chin and China would withdraw its claims from NEFA. According to John W. Garver, Zhou’s propositions were unofficial and subtle. Zhou consistently refused to accept the legitimacy of India’s territorial claims; he proposed that any negotiations had to take into account the facts on the ground.

Nehru stated “We will never compromise on our boundaries, but we are prepared to consider minor adjustments to them and to talk to the other side about them.” In light of these comments, the international community rallied behind Nehru in claiming that China was at fault in failing to conduct proper negotiations. Maxwell argues that Nehru’s words were ambiguous.

According to the official Indian history:

Nehru did not agree to barter away the Aksai Chin area, under illegal occupation of China, in return for China giving up its unreasonable claim to Indian territory south of the McMahon Line.

Start of the conflict

Composition: On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post at Chushul, in the Galwan Valley, north of the MacMahon Line. On 8 September 1962, a 60-strong PLA unit descended from the heights and occupied positions which dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola.

Disposition: As the Chinese numbers were exaggerated to 600 instead of about 50 or 60, the 9 Punjab battalion, numbering 400 riflemen, was sent to Dhola.

On 10 October, these 50 Indian troops were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers.

2/Sumdorong Chu standoff: In 1986–87, a military standoff took place between India and China in the Sumdorong Chu Valley bordering the Tawang district, Arunachal Pradesh and Cona County, Tibet. It was initiated by China moving a company of troops to Wangdung, a pasture to the south of Sumdorong Chu that India believed to be its territory.

Composition: The exercise involved 10 divisions of the Indian Army and several squadrons of the IAF and a redeployment of troops at several places in North East India.

Disposition: The Indian Army moved 3 divisions to positions around Wangdung, where they were supplied and maintained solely by air. These troop reinforcements were over and above the 50,000 troops already present across Arunachal Pradesh.

3/2013 Depsang standoff: The 2013 Depsang standoff, also called 2013 Depsang incursion, or 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi incident, was an incursion and sit-in by a platoon-sized contingent of the Chinese PLA in the dry river bed of Raki Nala, in the Depsang Bulge area, 30 km south of Daulat Beg Oldi near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the disputed Aksai Chin region.

Composition: During the night of 15 April 2013, a platoon of 50 Chinese troops established an encampment in four tents in the dry river bed of Raki Nala in the Depsang Bulge, which represents the valley of Burtsa Nala or Tiannan River.

Disposition: Indian forces responded to the Chinese presence by quickly establishing their own encampment 300 metres (980 ft) away.

4/ 2017 China–India border standoff: The 2017 China–India border standoff or Doklam standoff was a military border standoff between the Indian Armed Forces and the People’s Liberation Army of China over Chinese construction of a road in Doklam, near a trijunction border area known in Chinese as Donglang, or Donglang Caochang (meaning Donglang pasture or grazing field). On 16 June 2017 Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory that is claimed by both China and India’s ally Bhutan.

Composition: On 18 June 2017, as part of Operation Juniper, about 270 armed Indian troops with two bulldozers crossed the Sikkim border into Doklam, to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road.

Disposition: On 28 August, both India and China announced that they had withdrawn all their troops from the face-off site in Doklam. On 2 August 2017, the Chinese foreign ministry released a 15-page official position statement The Facts and China’s Position Concerning the Indian Border Troops’ Crossing of the China-India Boundary in the Sikkim Sector into the Chinese Territory. According to this document, there were still over 40 Indian troops and one bulldozer in Doklam (Donglang) region.

5/2020–2021 China–India skirmishes:

Beginning on 5 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops engaged in aggressive melee, face-offs, and skirmishes at locations along the Sino-Indian border, including near the disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and near the border between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Additional clashes also took place at locations in eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Composition: April 2020 onwards divisions from the Western Theatre Command of PLA’s Ground Force, the 4th (Highland) Motorized Infantry and 6th (Highland) Mechanised Infantry Divisions, moved units towards the LAC in eastern Ladakh reinforcing the existing deployment. The divisions stayed in eastern Ladakh from May 2020 to February 2021 following which they rotated with the 8th and the 11th motorised Divisions. PLA Air Force and PLA Rocket Force deployed in support.

Disposition: Post Galwan, there has been an overall increase in India’s deployment against China in all three sectors— the northern, central and eastern sectors. Prior deployment by India directed towards China included 14 Corps based in Leh, 17 Corps and 33 Corps in Sikkim, and 3 Corps and 4 Corps in the eastern sector. Additions and changes have been made to this such as a proposed reorganising of the 14 Division, earmarked for fighting against Pakistan in the plains, into a mountain division for deployment in Himachal and Uttarakhand against China. India’s paramilitary such as the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) is deployed closer to the border at most locations, with the army holding line some kilometres behind them.

Sino-Indian military Capabilities:

To accurately represent the functional capabilities of both countries in the times to come, any attempt to contrast their militaries must be done in the context of military modernization and their conceivable advancement in the near future.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China’s expenditure on its military has increased from 2.5 times that of India’s in 2010, to 3.7 times India’s in 2019, and reaching over four times India’s military expenditure in 2015. This big marginal difference is partly explained by the fact that while Indian military expenditure has reduced from 2.7 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010 to 2.4 percent in 2019, China’s expenditure on its military has stayed largely consistent since 2010 at around 1.9 percent of its GDP. Mostly, however, the primary reason for the gap is the sheer size of China’s GDP, which is estimated by the World Bank to have reached US$13.61 trillion in 2018 as compared with India’s US$2.72 trillion (in current US$). China’s GDP growth per annum has also increased rapidly since 2010.

This multiplication of cutting-edge military technology by China and much of its modernization depends solely on the quality of its recruits, the experience of its commanders, and other such soft skills that have been weighed and found wanting.

Intentions: As per timelines of history, if we analyse all the standoffs starting from 1962 till 2022, we can clearly navigate the fact that- The border dispute between India and China primarily centres around the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which separates the two countries. The origins of the dispute can be traced back to the 1950s, when China began to assert control over the Aksai Chin region, which India claims as part of its territory. The 1962 war between the two countries further complicated the situation, leading to the establishment of the LAC as a de facto boundary.

Geopolitical Strategies

Territorial Integrity: Both India and China view the disputed territories as integral parts of their national identity and sovereignty. For India, the regions of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh are crucial for its territorial integrity. For China, control over these areas is seen as a strategic advantage in terms of defence and regional influence.

Regional Influence: The border dispute is also a reflection of the broader competition for regional influence between India and China. Both countries are vying for dominance in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, which has implications for their economic and military strategies.

Economic Interests

The disputed areas are rich in natural resources, including minerals and water sources. Control over these resources is a significant economic incentive for both countries. Additionally, the border regions are strategically located along important trade routes, making them valuable for economic and logistical reasons.

Security Concerns

The presence of military forces along the LAC is a major security concern for both countries. The Doklam standoff in 2017 and the Galwan Valley clash in 2020 highlighted the potential for military escalation and the need for robust defence mechanisms. Both countries have invested heavily in military infrastructure along the border, reflecting their commitment to securing their respective claims.

Diplomatic Efforts

Despite the ongoing tensions, both India and China have engaged in diplomatic efforts to manage the dispute. The Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, which emphasised mutual respect and peaceful coexistence, was an early attempt to address the issue diplomatically. More recent efforts include high-level talks and agreements on disengagement and de-escalation, such as the October 2024 agreement to resume patrol along the border.

Tactical & Strategic Assessment:

Current Situation (Tactical assessment)

Disengagement and Patrols: As of November 2024, India and China have reached an agreement to resume coordinated patrolling along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. Both sides have completed disengagement at key friction points like Depsang and Demchok.

Military Infrastructure: India has significantly bolstered its military infrastructure in Ladakh over the past few years, including the construction of roads, airstrips, and advanced surveillance systems. This has enhanced India’s rapid response capabilities.

Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs): India is set to deploy IBGs by 2025, which will consist of 5,500-6,000 personnel led by a two-star general. These groups are designed to enhance India’s strategic readiness and rapid response capabilities.

China’s Tactics

Incremental Actions: China has been taking incremental and tactical actions to press its territorial claims along the LAC. This includes the construction of infrastructure and the deployment of troops in strategic locations.

Western Theatre Command: China has reorganised its military zones into five theatre commands, with the Western Theatre Command specifically overseeing operations near the Indian border. This command structure includes both ground and air forces, providing a rapid response capability.

Combined Armed Brigades (CABs): China has transformed several of its divisions into CABs to enhance operational cohesion and combat effectiveness

Tactical Considerations

High-Altitude Warfare: The standoff occurs in high-altitude mountainous terrain, which presents unique challenges for both sides. The harsh environment affects troop movement, logistics, and combat operations.

Strategic Balance: India’s deployment of IBGs is intended to counterbalance China’s growing military presence along the border. These groups will consolidate various military assets under a single command to streamline response times and coordination.

Diplomatic Efforts: High-level talks between Indian and Chinese officials have been crucial in de-escalating tensions and reaching agreements on disengagement. Diplomatic channels remain open to address any future flare-ups.

Strategic Context

Historical Grievances: The border dispute between India and China dates back to the 1962 war, which left unresolved territorial claims and created long-standing mistrust. The recent standoffs in Doklam (2017) and Ladakh (2020) have further strained relations.

Geopolitical Rivalry: Both India and China are rising powers with ambitions to expand their influence in South Asia and beyond. The standoff is a manifestation of their broader strategic rivalry, with each side seeking to assert its dominance in the region.

Strategic Objectives

Territorial Integrity: For India, maintaining control over the disputed territories in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh is crucial for its territorial integrity and national security. For China, securing control over Aksai Chin and other areas is seen as a strategic necessity to protect its western borders.

 

Military Presence: Both countries have significantly increased their military presence along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India has constructed new roads, airstrips, and advanced surveillance systems, while China has deployed troops and built infrastructure in the region.

Strategic Calculations

Economic Interests: The disputed areas are rich in natural resources, including minerals and water sources. Control over these resources is a significant economic incentive for both countries.

Regional Influence: The standoff has implications for regional stability and the balance of power in South Asia. Both India and China are vying for influence in the region, with India seeking to counter China’s growing presence.

Strategic Challenges

High-Altitude Warfare: The standoff occurs in high-altitude mountainous terrain, which presents unique challenges for both sides. The harsh environment affects troop movement, logistics, and combat operations.

Diplomatic Efforts: Despite the ongoing tensions, both countries have engaged in diplomatic efforts to manage the dispute. High-level talks and agreements on disengagement and de-escalation have been crucial in reducing immediate tensions.

Threat Analysis:

Enemy capabilities – China’s rapid military modernization, including advancements in cyber warfare, missile technology, and naval capabilities, poses a significant threat to India’s security. India, in response, has been enhancing its own military capabilities, including the development of nuclear and conventional forces.

Territorial Disputes: The primary source of tension is the unresolved border disputes, particularly along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Both countries have deployed significant military forces in these regions, leading to periodic standoffs and skirmishes.

Enemy Intentions:

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): China’s BRI, which aims to enhance its economic influence across Asia and beyond, has raised concerns in India about China’s growing presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India perceives this as a strategic encirclement and a threat to its regional dominance.

Trade Imbalance: The trade imbalance between India and China, with China being a major exporter to India, has economic implications for India’s industrial and technological development.

Potential Scenarios

Geopolitical Threats

Regional Alliances: China’s strategic partnerships with countries in South Asia, such as Pakistan and Nepal, are viewed by India as a threat to its regional influence and security. These alliances are seen as part of China’s broader strategy to counter India’s influence.

US-India Relations: China views the growing military cooperation between India and the United States with concern, seeing it as a potential threat to its regional ambitions. The US-India strategic partnership, including joint military exercises and defence agreements, is perceived by China as an attempt to contain its rise.

Perception of Threat

Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions: There is an asymmetry in how India and China perceive each other’s threats. India views China’s military modernization and regional alliances as significant threats, while China does not consider India a primary security challenge but is wary of India’s growing ties with the US.

Historical Mistrust: The historical context of the 1962 war and subsequent border disputes have created a legacy of mistrust between the two countries, influencing their threat perceptions and strategic calculations.

Recommendations:

Operational Recommendation:

Military De-escalation and Disengagement

Phased Disengagement: Implement a phased disengagement plan at key friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to reduce the risk of accidental clashes.

Patrolling Agreements: Establish clear and mutually agreed-upon patrolling protocols to prevent misunderstandings and ensure smooth patrolling activities.

4. Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs)

Deployment of IBGs: Deploy Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) to enhance India’s rapid response capabilities and strategic readiness along the border.

Training and Preparedness: Ensure that IBGs are well-trained and equipped to operate in high-altitude and challenging terrains.

Cybersecurity and Space Security

Cybersecurity Cooperation: Enhance cooperation in cybersecurity to prevent cyber-attacks and protect critical infrastructure.

Space Security: Collaborate on space security initiatives to prevent the militarization of space and ensure the peaceful use of outer space.

Strategic Recommendations:

Enhanced Diplomatic Engagement

Regular High-Level Dialogues: Increase the frequency of high-level diplomatic meetings between Indian and Chinese officials to address and resolve border disputes and other issues.

Confidence-Building Measures: Implement more confidence-building measures, such as joint military exercises, cultural exchanges, and transparency in military activities.

Strengthening Border Infrastructure

Improved Infrastructure: Continue to enhance border infrastructure, including roads, communication networks, and surveillance systems, to ensure better logistical support and rapid response capabilities.

Joint Infrastructure Projects: Explore the possibility of joint infrastructure projects along the border to foster cooperation and mutual benefits.

Regional Cooperation

Multilateral Forums: Engage in multilateral forums and regional cooperation initiatives to address common security concerns and promote stability in the region.

Economic Partnerships: Strengthen economic partnerships and trade relations to build mutual trust and reduce economic tensions.

 

 

Public Communication and Transparency

Public Communication: Maintain transparent communication with the public about the steps being taken to manage the border situation and reduce tensions.

Media Engagement: Engage with media outlets to provide accurate information and counter misinformation.

Long-Term Boundary Negotiations

Boundary Settlement: Continue long-term boundary negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable resolution to the border dispute.

Historical Context: Acknowledge and address historical grievances and sensitivities to build a foundation for lasting peace.

Conclusion:

The India-China border dispute is driven by a combination of historical grievances, geopolitical strategies, economic interests, and security concerns. While diplomatic efforts have led to some progress, the underlying issues remain unresolved, and the potential for future conflicts persists. The India-China military standoff is a complex and evolving situation, with both sides taking tactical and strategic measures to assert their positions. While recent disengagement agreements have reduced immediate tensions, the underlying issues remain unresolved. Continued diplomatic efforts and military preparedness will be essential to manage the situation and prevent future conflicts.

By implementing the above-mentioned recommendations, India and China can work towards a more stable and peaceful relationship, reducing the risk of future conflicts and promoting regional security.

Annexes: