Executive Summary:

This report goes in depth about the land corridor of Iran which stretches from Iran to Lebanon. The corridor is used to transport people and weapons from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon via land passage through Iraq and Syria. The land corridor has been built to aid the axis of resistance in their operations. An air route via Damascus exists but in case of any escalation of hostilities the air route becomes vulnerable. Land route on the other hand is a preferred alternative because the military of Iraq and Syria helps them pass through safely. This report outlines the background, current developments and routes of the land bridge. It gives a brief account of IRGC and the QUDS Force. It takes us through the counter strategies of the US and finally gives a detailed account of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and its leadership.

Iran is a major stakeholder in the region of West Asia and its hyperbola of influence has only seen a positive curve. Iran refers to the Land Bridge (which it considers a western concept) as the land corridor or the axis of resistance. In Persian it becomes Mehvar-e Moghavemat. The foundations of the corridor were laid a long time ago, in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war it became clear to Iran that it has to build itself up to the epitome of self-reliance. Ayatollah Khomeini wanted Iran to emerge from the ashes of the war and claim its position as the rightful protector of the Islamic faith in the religion by taking the whole of West Asia under the umbrella of Shia Mullahcracy. Though the region is dominated in the sense of population by the Sunnis and the Kurds, they mainly remained fragmented whereas Iran managed to garner the support of Shia states, semi-state and non-state actors. After the US invasion of Iraq, the subsequent toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government created a power vacuum that Iran played to its benefits and with the withdrawal of the US troops, nothing stood in the way to make this dream a reality. After the al-Asaad regime and Iran grew to be close allies since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War; Iran could finally give shape to its geopolitical construct. It is a route that connects Iran to the Mediterranean.

The Land Bridge has three corridors-

• The first corridor is the Northern Corridor that crosses through Sinjar at the Rabia (36.805364957733886, 42.091712642192014) border crossing to enter al-Ya’rubiyah (36.81079384347685, 42.06424682242274)
• The second corridor follows Euphrates out of Baghdad, through the desert to the west and the north until it reaches the border of al-Qaim, it then crosses into Albu Kamal (34.45226, 40.91854), Syria.
• The third corridor is near al-Tanf (33.48959, 38.663021) at the trinational border with Jordan.

In May 2017, the Shiite militia made their junction on the Syrian-Iraqi border between the US and al-Tanf base and the city of al-Bu Kamal, opening the first direct route between Beirut and Tehran. In 2019 the Iranian Vice President Mr. Jahangiri declared Iran’s intention to “connect the Persian Gulf from Iraq to Syria & Mediterranean via railways and roads.

On 4th September 2024, Iranian militias transferred weapons and vehicles from Al-Thaala Military Airport in the Eastern countryside of As-Suwayda towards Bely Airport in the Damascus countryside. Among the weapons were Medium-Range Missiles and Drones. Prior to this, in august, a large meeting of leaders of Iranian-backed militias took place in the countryside of Al-Bukamal.

IRGC: The Architect of the Iranian Crescent

The first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution to help preserve the status-quo in favor of its parent regime. When the Shah’s government was overthrown, the SAVAK was done away with but the army was retained. The IRGC loyal to the Supreme Leader was created. In the Iran-Iraq war it bit more than it could chew and it actually paid off, it outshined in the eyes of the authorities and was endowed with building Iran back. The IRGC has a foreign branch known as the QUDS Force (IRGC-QF) to exert ideological, political and cultural dominance. It upholsters the task of training and aiding the Axis of Resistance, Shia militias that have pledged their allegiance to Iran. The IRGC is more than just an army, it has a business conglomerate, and they have been elevated to the position of a political and economic actor. It has become one of the largest economic forces in the country. They dominate many sectors including- construction, banking and finance and telecommunications. The company named Khatam-al Anbiya is involved in road constructions across Iran. The commander of the IRGC is the head of the Khatam-al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.

The IRGC reinforces and perpetuates a vicious cycle of sectarian violence. They outsource this violence through the Axis of Resistance which includes the Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Houthis, al-Assad regime and the militant groups in Iraq and Syria. Qassem Solemani used to lead it and Iran had elevated him to the ranks of being recognized as the mastermind behind the axis of resistance. He was assassinated by a drone strike by the US forces under the Trump administration.

The land bridge crosses Baquba, capital of the province of Diyala in Iraq (a mixed Sunni/Shia region). It lies about 60 miles to the north of Baghdad. It shares its eastern border with Iran, its northern border with Kurdistan, and its western border is shaped by the flow of the Tigris River. From there it goes into the town of Shirqat in Salaheddin province and from thereon continues to Mosul which is 50 miles southeast of Sinjar. Next in route is the Rabia crossing followed by Qamishli and Kobani towards Irfin (which is controlled by the YPG militias, a Kurdish militant group). The route continues onto Aleppo and heads towards Homs– the Alawite stronghold of the region to reach the port of Latakia in Syria (situated on the Mediterranean).

Northern Route

Key border crossing: Rabia (Iraq) to al-Ya’rubiyah (Syria)

Key highway: Highway 1 and Highway 47 in Iraq

Highway 6 and Motorway M4 in Syria

Southern Route- upper branch

Key border crossing: al-Qaim (Iraq) to Albu Kamal (Syria)

Key Roads: Highway 12 (Iraq); Highway 4 (Syria)

Southern Route- lower branch

Key border crossing: al-Walid (Iraq) to al-Tanf (Syria)

Key roads: Highway 11 or Expressway 1 (Iraq); Highway 2 (Syria)

Containment Strategy: A Handbook by the US

President Trump, on 2nd October, 2017 enacted the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act which included sanctions on Iran.It requires imposition of sanctions contained in EO 13224 (terrorism) on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its officials, agents, and affiliates. The IRGC’s Qods Force, which supports pro-Iranian governments and factions throughout the Middle East, is designated under EO 13224.

The US maintains numerous bases in the West Asian region to maintain its sphere of influence. Here is a list of its bases in the region

• Turkey- Izmir Air Base, Incirlik Air Base
• Saudi Arabia – Prince Sultan Air Base with over 2000 military personnel
• UAE – Al Dhafra Air Base which is capable of deploying tanker planes for refueling
• Bahrain – Naval Support Activity Bahrain, the base of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet
• Qatar – Al Udeid Air Base, serves as forward headquarters of the US Central Command and headquarters of the US Air Forces Central Command
• Jordan – Tower 22, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, Joint Training Center Jordan with over 3,000 US military personnel
• Iraq – Al Asad Airbase and Al Harir Airbase
• Syria – Al-Tanf, about 900 US military personnel
• Egypt – Task Force Sina, maintained in the Sinai Peninsula
• Israel – Site 512, a radar base supposedly used by the US to track ballistic missile threats
• Kuwait – Camp Arifjan, Camp Buehring, Camp Spearhead, Camp Patriot
• Oman – Thumrait Air Base

Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, highest Shia authority in Iraq called for the formation of al-Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilization Forces by issuing a fatwa. Since its inception, it has consisted of 50-70 militias. Each political party formed its own group under the sectarian agenda. Since the failure of the government apparatus in 2014 many militant groups volunteered to join the ISF. Amongst those, the most lethal groups were- PMF, Badr Organization and Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, Saraya al-Salam, Kataib Hezbollah, Liwa al-Imam Ali, Liwa Ali al-Akbar, Liwa Abul Fadhl al-Abbas and Kataib Sayid al-Shuhada. The Popular Mobilization Forces today hope to drive the US out of Iraq as the war in Gaza Strip continues. Since October 7, when the war began, the forces have attacked the US forces over 160 times. Kataib Hezbollah is a militant group affiliated to the Popular Mobilization Forces, it attacked Jordan to kill Americans. PMF has become a quasi-political body. It contested elections back in 2018 in Iraq and emerged with the second position. In December 2023, they contested again and secured 101 out of 285 provincial seats.

Leadership:

Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, who was Soleimani’s top Iraqi lieutenant, served as the PMF Chief of Staff prior to his death in a US airstrike in 2020.

Chief of Staff: Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi (Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi)

Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman: Faleh al Fayyadh

Anbar Operations Command

Commander: Qasim Musleh al Khafaji. Khafaji also commands the 13^th PMF Brigade (Liwa al Tafuf) and is close to Kataib Hezbollah

Baghdad Operations Command

Commander: Hussein al Samahi. Samahi is a member of Asaib Ahl al Haq and reportedly supported Iranian-backed Iraqi militias fighting in Syria in the early 2010s to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime.

Basra Operations Command

Commander: Mahdi Saleh Abdul Wahab (Haj Abu Jinan al Basri). He also commands the 1^st PMF Brigade

Diyala Operations Command

Commander: Talib al Musawi. Musawi is affiliated with the Badr Organization.

Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command

Commander: Abu Hussam al Sahlani. Sahlani is affiliated with the Badr Organization.

Northern Axis Command Commander: Abu Ridha Yilmaz al Najjar

Jazeera and Badia Operations Command

Commander: Unknown. The Jazeera and Badia Operations Deputy Commander is Hajj Abu Nasser, which is presumably a pseudonym

Middle Euphrates Operations Command

Commander: Ali al Hamdani

Ninewa Operations Command

Commander: Khadhir al Matrohi. Matrohi is affiliated with the Badr Organization

Rafidain Operations Command

Commander: Nazim Kazem Musa al Saadi (Abu Huda al Saadi)

Salah ad Din Operations Command

Commander: Safaa al Saadi. Saadi is affiliated with Asaib Ahl al Haq

Samarra Operations Command

Commander: Hussein al Saedi (Abu Zainab al Saedi). Saedi is affiliated with the Sadrist Movement

Conclusion:

Iran is playing a long game. It has been laying groundwork for decades now, Iran is not going to make any hasty decisions. Clausewitz said that a war is driven forward by the triad of – passion, chance and politics and Iran has all of those to fuel its peregrination for maximizing national interest and to take the whole of West Asia under its umbrella of Shia Mullahcracy. As Iran sees it, it controls the Red Sea via the Houthis, the Mediterranean through Hezbollah and maintains a political influence in Iraq and Syria. It also controls the supply chain of weapons through its Land Corridor. Iran has patiently waited out the sanctions against it along with the criticism from the world. This wait has made it deadlier. Given the years of investment in proxy battles, Iran has no intention of backing out or going for a peaceful settlement, it is just keeping the world on edge in anticipation of its unpredictable decisions and actions.