Executive Summary:
This report analyzes Vietnam’s intensified expansion of artificial islands in the disputed Spratly (Trong Sa) Islands in the South China Sea since November 2023 aiming to counter China’s growing presence and as self-defense, part of a broader strategy to counter security threats “early and from afar”. Vietnam is planning to expand more than 1,000 acres of new lands this year as it continues to stake its claims to territory. This report examines Vietnam’s strategic implications, regional consequences, and China’s reaction.
BACKGROUND:
Various countries such as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei, claim over the Spratly Islands. With their own different historical and legal arguments supporting their sovereign claims, owing to their strategic importance for global trade and richness in fisheries and energy resources. Since the end of 2023, Vietnam regained over 280 hectares (692 acres) in 10 features up to mid-2024. Compared to its previous record it has only added 163.5 hectares (404 acres) in the first 11 months of 2023 and 138.4 hectares (342 acres) in 2022. This is a response to China’s earlier large-scale reclamation efforts, which transformed reefs into militarized outposts.
These islands are claimed by China as part of its controversial “nine-dash line” map. China has been building artificial islands since the mid-2010s, changing reefs into militarized military outposts with heavy infrastructure. This is a concern to Southeast Asia and the world at large since an international tribunal announced last year that China’s expansive territorial claims are void.
Historical claim:
The Spratly Islands, which Vietnam and China both have been claiming since the 17th century, have been occupied and developed by Vietnam since 1974. However, Malaysia started land reclamation on Layang Layang, also known as Swallow Reef, in 1980 to build a military presence and China started big-scale land reclamation in 2013 after the occupation of Vietnam and land reclamation by Malaysia. The Philippines formalized its claim in 2012, under Administrative Order No. 29 though it has been rejected by Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan.
Vietnam now occupies five of the 10 largest features in the Spratly Islands. Down below are the 10 largest islands and their occupants:
China: Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef consist of multi-story administrative buildings, advanced radar arrays, jet hangars, and 3,000-meter runways capable of handling the largest Chinese bombers.
Vietnam: Barque Canada Reef, Namyit Island, Pearson Reef, and Discovery Great Reef.
Taiwan: Itu Aba
Philippines: Thitu Island
Vietnam: Sand Cay
KEY FINDINGS:
- Vietnam has reclaimed 955 hectares (2,360 acres) around half of China’s total of 1,882 hectares (4,650 acres) up from just 329 acres (133 hectares) three years ago.
- The gap between the two countries is narrowing in terms of land area but remains wide in terms of military capability.
- Barque Canada Reef, Vietnam’s largest outpost, has doubled in size from 96 to 167 hectares and now measures 4,318 meters in length and could host a 3,000-meter runway like China’s facilities. Now it has a single 1,300-meter runway on Spratly Island.
- Other developments like the completion of a boat ramp on Namyit Island and the construction of a new harbor at Central Reef.
- Vietnam is expanding its maritime militia mirroring China and enhancing security ties with the U.S., Japan, and Australia.
- U.S. support includes arms sales, transferring two Coast Guard cutters, delivering 12 training aircraft as part of more than $330 million worth of security assistance and a port visit by a U.S. Navy vessel to Cam Ranh Bay, and strengthening Vietnam’s defense posture.
- China’s extensive military fortifications on its reclaimed islands remain a major strategic advantage. In contrast, Vietnam’s outposts are still primarily defensive.
- The Philippines is monitoring what Vietnam is doing in the Spratly Islands but it does not think Vietnam poses a direct threat, at least not as considerable as China’s threats.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS:
- Countering China’s Military Expansion: On one hand, Vietnamese construction is meant to challenge Chinese expansion, though its facilities are less developed than that of China. Where China has built airstrips, radar systems, missile batteries, and hangars capable of housing military jets. Vietnam’s facilities remain far less developed than China’s; however, its construction of new harbors, boat ramps, and defensive emplacements shows an intention to develop its positions and resist Chinese incursions.
- Maintaining Sovereign Claims: Vietnam’s actions may thus be viewed as part of a wider policy of ‘facts on the ground’ in an unstable borderland. Vietnam, therefore, by taking physical control of the claimed features, strengthens its sovereignty claims under international law, especially against the backdrop of increasing Chinese aggression against its neighbors, including the Philippines. This is part of a broader effort to assert its rights in the South China Sea, despite the asymmetric power balance with China.
- Geopolitical Balance and Regional Security: Vietnam’s actions have so far not triggered significant diplomatic fallout from other claimants, such as the Philippines, whose navy officials noted that Vietnam’s actions have not involved harassment or coercion. Unlike China, Vietnam has not deployed maritime militia or opposed the Philippines use of its own claimed waters. This suggests that Vietnam’s island-building is seen less as a threat by other regional actors and more as a necessary counterbalance to Chinese aggression.
- Strategic Partnerships: Part of Vietnam’s initiative to establish a stronger presence in Spratlys can also be part of its larger strategy to align itself with external powers, like the United States, which maintains close ties with the Philippines. Though Vietnam does not have a formal alliance with the United States, one of the key Southeast Asian counterbalances against China may further enhance its security cooperation with Washington.
- China’s Response and Countermeasures: China has made clear its intention to dominate the South China Sea, conducting regular patrols, militarizing reclaimed islands, and intimidating smaller claimant states like the Philippines through economic and military pressure. While Vietnam’s recent activities did not elicit a direct military retaliation from China, it condemned all “illegitimate” constructions in the Spratlys as illegal.
ANALYSIS & FORECAST:
- Vietnam’s intensified island-building efforts will likely continue throughout 2024, with further land reclamation and infrastructure development. The country’s objective is not to surpass China’s military might in the region but to secure a foothold that deters Chinese expansionism and solidifies its territorial claims.
- However, Vietnam’s relatively lower economic and military capacity will limit its possibility to catch up with China. Inevitably, Vietnam will seek stronger contacts with outside powers, such as the United States, which has strategic interests in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
- Direct military conflict between Vietnam and China remains low, yet tension will only increase as each tries to bolster its position further. Political contestation, coupled with strategic moves, will be at stake in the South China Sea, and the Spratly Islands will be at the very heart of the struggle for regional dominance.
- While huge, Vietnam’s artificial islands are way behind China’s military infrastructure in the region. However, Vietnam’s progress may provoke China to make further improvements in its military assets or increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Hanoi.
CONCLUSION:
Vietnam’s artificial island-building in the Spratlys is a strategic response to the dominance of China on its territorial claims, thus creating new land that will enhance its defensive capabilities. Even though it cannot compare with China’s military infrastructure, it remains highly important to maintain the balance of regional power and will be key to what the future geopolitical landscape of the South China Sea dispute will look like.
Annexure:
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