Israel’s Counter in the Red Sea

Executive Summary

This report examines the implications of a potential agreement between Israel and Somaliland, wherein Israel would recognize Somaliland as an independent entity in exchange for establishing a military base at the Port of Berbera. This arrangement is positioned within the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa, particularly in the context of regional security and economic development. For Israel it is a counterbalancing act against the Houthi operations in the region, facilitating intelligence operations and enhancing maritime security in a key shipping corridor. For Somaliland, Israeli recognition represents a significant step toward international legitimacy, potentially paving the way for broader diplomatic recognition from Western nations. It could mean possible investments in the field of infrastructure, energy, agriculture and financial aid from international institutions. The report also talks about the geopolitical significance of the country and discusses the mutual benefits that both the countries derive from this deal.

The Struggle for Statehood in the Horn of Africa

Somaliland is considered to be a renegade province by most of the world due to the lack of recognition from the parent country, Somalia. Somaliland is a semi-dessert territory on the coast of Gulf of Aden. It shares borders with Ethiopia to its south and west and with Djibouti to its northwest. For over three decades, Somaliland has been self-governing, with limited access to international markets and foreign governments. The region was a British protectorate till the 1960s. In 1961 Somaliland decided to unite with Somalia with the aim of creating a “Greater Somalia” bringing together all the people of ethnic Somali origin in five countries in the Horn of Africa including Northern Kenya, Italian Somalia, French Somaliland and Eastern Ethiopia. A total disenchantment happened when the people of north Somalia (Somaliland) saw key positions of the politics and military go into the hands of people from south Somalia. After assuming power in a military coup in October 1969, Mohamed Siad Barre led a brutal military dictatorship, which instigated the birth of Somali National Movement (SNM), a rebel group based in Somaliland. As a response to growing opposition, and in a war with its own people, the Barre regime waged a targeted war on the north (Somaliland), killing an estimated 50,000 civilians and displacing an estimated 500,000 people. In 1991, SNM and other armed groups ousted the Barre regime. They refused to recognize another armed group as the leader of the interim government and decided to declare the independence of Somaliland. Somaliland insists upon colonial-era borders to be maintained. It claims sovereignty on the basis of having a democratic and stable state holding free and fair elections, has its own National Army, currency and passports. A bulk of Somalilan’s GDP is a contribution from the people of Somaliland working abroad. It cannot request financial aid from the World Bank or the IMF since Mogadishu refuses to recognise it.

Geopolitical Leverage

• Somaliland sits at the entrance of Bab el-Mandeb Strait through which almost one-third of the trade passes. It connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and Djibouti. It is positioned between the Arabian Peninsula in Asia and the African continent, bridging the gaps. The strait is about 26-32 kilometers wide, with an average depth of 150 meters. Most of the oil exports from the Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline also need to pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. According to World Bank data, approximately 30% of oil and 40% of dry goods are transported via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, making the Bab el-Mandeb Strait a crucial route for these shipments.
• The Berbera Port Deal

 

On 1 January 2024, the leaders of Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding granting Addis Ababa 50-year access to a strip of coastline on the Gulf of Aden.It allows Ethiopia to lease a 20-kilometer stretch of coastline and to establish a naval port there. Meanwhile, Ethiopia will become the first country in Africa to formally recognise Somaliland’s statehood. Mogadishu was enraged by this and called it an act of aggression.

Ethiopia is one of the most populous land-locked countries with a population of about 120 million. It has been using Djibouti for trade. Djibouti charges Ethiopia about USD 1.5 billion annually in port fees, which had the country look for alternatives. Ethiopian officials have suggested that the new facility will have both military and commercial purposes. The deal provides for Hargeisa to obtain shares in Ethiopian state-owned enterprises such as Ethiopian Airlines. In 2019, Ethiopia bought a 19 percent stake in the Port of Berbera with Somaliland retaining 30 percent and Dubai firm and port manager DP World holding 51 percent. In exchange for financing a continuing upgrade of the port with about $442m, DP World will manage the port for 30 years. The United Arab Emirates group’s investment in Berbera fell through as it became a big controversy and the parliament in Somalia voted it out.

The economy of the country suffered after the COVID-19 pandemic and the Tigray War (2020-2022), Ethiopia fought a war with militants from its northernmost region of Tigray, then under the control of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The county took financial loans and defaulted, in this context, it really needed to diversify its options and look for strategic partnership. When Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993 after a three decade-long war, Ethiopia lost its direct access to the Red Sea.

• Port of Berbera

Berbera port is located on the northern coast of Somalia, on the southeastern end of the Gulf of Aden. The entrance channel is 800 m wide and around 16.5 m deep providing two anchorages. Approximately 250,000 tonnes of cargo and more than 130 vessels are handled at the Berbera port every year. Berbera port has 10 mobile cranes with a 70-tonne lifting capacity, 2 forklifts, 3 reach stackers and 5 port trucks. The container terminal is a new facility that became operational in June 2021.

Country	Berbera, Somaliland
Province or District	Berbera District
Town or City (Closest location) with Distance (km)	Name: Berbera (1 km) and Hargeisa (160 km)
Port’s Complete Name	Berbera Port
Latitude	10° 26′ 00″ N
Longitude	45° 01′ 00″ E
Managing Company or Port Authority (If more than one operator, break down by area of operation)	Berbera Port Authority (Somaliland Government)

Closest Airport and Frequent Airlines to / from International Destinations	Berbera Airport (7 km) Hargeisa Airport (160 km)

Major Import Campaigns	Yes	Local Authorities, Humanitarian agencies, and commercial sector
Other	Somaliland is a major exporter of livestock to mostly Saudi Arabia In 2013, 2.5 million head of goats, sheep and camels were exported Livestock carriers have berthing priority and during periods around religious festivals this can cause delays.

 

• Access to Bab el Mandeb- The Bab el-Mandeb Strait serves as a strategic fulcrum in the maritime corridor connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea and Suez Canal. On one side lies the Arabian Peninsula, while the other is anchored by the Horn of Africa. Together with the Suez Canal, this route offers a more efficient transit option for vessels moving between the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and onward to Southeast Asia—circumventing the need for a costly detour around the Cape of Good Hope. The strait’s role is critical for oil exports from the Persian Gulf, which flow through the Suez Canal and Sumed pipeline, making the Bab el-Mandeb an indispensable gateway for regional trade. Yet, political instability among neighboring states has ensured that no single nation exerts full control over it, keeping it a geopolitical hotspot. On the western shore, Eritrea and Djibouti engaged in a border conflict in 2008, officially concluding in 2018 but remaining sensitive as Eritrea has since re-engaged in regional conflicts, such as in Ethiopia in 2022. Somalia, too, remains entrenched in insecurity. Meanwhile, Yemen on the eastern coast has been mired in civil war since 2015, leaving the strait without a dominant overseer.

Since the rise of the Houthis has changed the geopolitical balance of power in the Middle East, it puts the strategic interests of the US and Israel in the region at risk. In addition, countries in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific region would also face great security risks if they want to enter and exit the Middle East through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Analysis

Israel is interested in establishing a presence in northern Somalia in order to monitor the activities of the Houthis in Yemen and oversee the Bab el Mandeb Strait. In exchange Israel is expected to recognize Somaliland. Somaliland has 740 kilometres of coastline along the Gulf of Aden and could play a key role in safeguarding the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea from piracy, terrorism, and smuggling which has become a global concern with the Houthis being rampant in the region. It is generating serious disruption across global trade routes. There are global and colossal repercussions due to the disruption of the supply chain and a constraint in business continuity thereof. This volatile security landscape is fueling hesitancy among international shipping companies to charter vessels through this critical chokepoint, a hesitation that is not without far-reaching economic and logistical consequences.

With Houthi strikes becoming an increasing risk factor, shipping firms are now facing tough strategic decisions, recalibrating routes to safeguard their assets and cargo. The alternative of circumnavigating the African continent—adding approximately ten days to transit times—has gained traction as a more secure, albeit costly, detour. This adjustment, however, introduces delays that ripple across global supply chains, adversely affecting delivery schedules for consumer goods and amplifying logistical expenses.

The international response has seen a convergence of multinational naval operations in the Red Sea, with an eye to stabilizing the strait and deterring further hostile actions. However, as long as the Bab al-Mandeb remains a site of active conflict, pressure will likely mount on shipping insurers, maritime operators, and regional actors to explore longer-term security solutions or to invest in alternative transit strategies that bypass this strategic yet increasingly precarious maritime corridor.

Israel’s strategic calculus in seeking a foothold near Yemen, specifically through a military base in Somaliland is an act of counterbalancing, Israel is looking to bolster its national security from foreign soils. It aligns perfectly with the country’s goal of curbing the influence of Iran in the region. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted a massive aerial attack on the Houthi facilities in Hodeidah in response to Houthi missile attacks on Tel Aviv. However, IAF jets had to travel some 1,100 miles (1,800 km) to reach their targets in Yemen. This is extra work, if the country has a base in Somaliland, it can effectively respond to such threats within a short span of time.

As a Jewish country that exists in a geopolitical crucible, where it is surrounded by nations that share the same faith and ideology. This confines the country . In this context, self-reliance and strategic partnership along with fostering alliances with other countries is the only thing the country can do to elevate its strategic depth. Ever since the October 7 attacks last year, this issue has heightened and Israel is seeking partnerships like this extensively. Some of the areas that the two countries could negotiate over are agriculture, infrastructure and energy. Israel could help the semi-arid region with its innovations in the field of agriculture, namely its kibbutz system and its irrigation technology. This could help with food security and overall economic security for the people in Somaliland.

The UAE’s normalization of relations with Israel was seen as an extension of the Abraham Accords, encouraged by the Trump administration. Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, both see the Houthis as a threat and could join hands in mitigating the risks involved in the region. The UAE maintains strong ties with both Somaliland and Somalia, leveraging its influence through strategic investments and military presence. Abu Dhabi was among the first to unofficially recognize Somaliland, establishing a foothold there as early as 2017 with a military base. This relationship has only deepened, as the UAE now trains Somaliland’s security forces. Dubai-based DP World’s $101 million project to expand the Berbera port—a key initiative that positions Berbera as an alternative to Djibouti’s port.

Somaliland on the other hand will gain global recognition, Israel’s endorsement of the strategic and economic significance of the region will have the West give their support and recognition to Somaliland. The Western economy has been feeling the blow of the instability in the region and will want to secure their business continuity. This will have them pay attention to Somaliland as their potential base for monitoring the region. Israel paves a way for the West to acknowledge Somaliland’s role without alienating Somalia or compromising existing alliances. The move also aligns with broader Western interests in curbing extremism and balancing out growing Chinese influence in East Africa. Recognition from the West will open up a whole new world to Somaliland, it would mean that the country can reach out to international institutions for aid and loans, something that the conflict ridden country could benefit from.

Conclusion

The deal is a quid pro quo, it gives both the parties what they require the most in this moment, a base to monitor terrorist activities and a recognition that opens up channels of diplomatic relations and economic investments. Enhanced cooperation in security, agriculture, and infrastructure could foster much-needed stability and development in a region marked by volatility and conflict. It is a deal that will draw sharp criticisms from Somalia but it is a risk that Israel is ready to take for its primary goal seems to be national security, curbing the influence of Iran beyond its borders and annihilating the Axis of Resistance which the Houthis form an important part of. Cutting it off would give Israel undeniable dominance over Iran.