Executive Summary

Islamic extremism in the Gulf region has intensified, driven by incidents like the 2024 Israel-Iran confrontation and past attacks on critical energy infrastructure, underscoring vulnerabilities to drone and missile warfare. AQAP has increasingly utilized global events, such as Quran burnings and the October 7 Israel-Hamas conflict, to fuel its propaganda, encouraging both lone-wolf and coordinated jihadist operations. The geopolitical landscape is also shaped by the surge in Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping routes, disrupting global trade and forcing rerouting via longer, more expensive routes like the Cape of Good Hope. Meanwhile, ISIS’s territorial advances in Somalia, including its control of key areas in Puntland, heighten regional instability, threatening vital maritime trade routes and exacerbating local conflicts. The overall situation in these regions, combined with growing terrorism risks, disrupts key global shipping routes, strains diplomatic relations, and raises concerns about the future of international migration.

Background

For several years, international observers have characterized the AQ threat as stemming mainly from the group’s affiliates in Yemen and Africa. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) of the U.S. The Intelligence Community described Africa as the “center of gravity in the Sunni global jihad.” Al-Qaeda has quickly capitalized on the anti-Israel sentiment triggered by the Israel-Hamas conflict, with its Yemen branch, AQAP, leading efforts to incite violence. AQAP has called for attacks on the U.S. and Europe in retaliation for supporting Israel, and urged targeting Jews in the West. Since October 7th, AQAP has released detailed bomb-making videos and instructions for placing explosives on civilian airliners. This marks a shift in AQAP’s tactics, now focusing on providing specific guidance for attacks on Western airliners and key political and economic targets, posing a significant threat given their history of successful operations.

By 2005, U.S.-backed Saudi efforts dismantled Al-Qaeda’s branch in Saudi Arabia, leaving fragmented cells. These cells merged with Yemeni operatives in 2009 to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization that year. AQAP thrived amid Yemen’s post-2011 instability, becoming one of Al-Qaeda’s most aggressive affiliates in targeting the U.S. and Europe. Despite setbacks from counterterrorism efforts and internal conflicts, AQAP remains Yemen’s most capable terrorist group, with regional and global ambitions. As Al-Qaeda expanded internationally through affiliates like AQAP, it drew the attention and alignment of other like minded extremist groups, further strengthening its global network.

Strategic Analysis

In early 2022, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) shifted its focus to southern Yemen, particularly Abyan, in a calculated effort to reassert its influence. The group staged a high-profile abduction of five UN employees, releasing a video of the captives to amplify its visibility. In Jaar, AQAP escalated its operations by targeting an Southern Transitional Council (STC) Security Belt commander’s convoy with a VBIED and suicide bombers, signaling a deliberate return to suicide tactics last prominent before 2015. These operations underscore AQAP’s adaptive strategy, concentrating on UAE-backed forces as part of its recalibration in Yemen’s evolving conflict landscape.

The rising Islamic extremism in the Gulf of Aden, as highlighted by the 2024 Israel-Iran confrontation and recent attacks such as the 2019 drone strike on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing plant and the 2022 attack on oil tanker trucks in Abu Dhabi, is reshaping the strategic environment for Gulf nations. Attacks on critical energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE highlight the vulnerability of Gulf oil facilities to asymmetrical warfare, including drones and missiles.

The January 3, 2024, double suicide bombing in Kerman, Iran, claimed by ISIS, and the March 22 attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall highlight the persistent threat of coordinated jihadist operations, which typically cause greater casualties compared to lone-actor attacks. A United Nations report released in January 2024 emphasized AQAP’s intensified media efforts, leveraging global incidents like Quran burnings and the October 7 attacks to inspire lone-wolf actors. Simultaneously, the group continues to pursue both regional and international operations, signaling a broadening of its strategic objectives.

In February 2024, AQAP released an “Inspire” video that broadened its focus to include the ideological, historical, and religious foundations of its violent jihad, alongside operational guidance. The video reinforced its narrative of “defending Islam” by advocating attacks on “Jews, polytheists, Crusaders, and apostates.” It highlighted historical instances of individual jihadists to portray such actions as heroic and impactful. The video featured a speech by AQ ideologue Abu Hudhayfah al-Sudani, who praised Palestinian militants, urged violence against Jews and Christians, and framed such attacks as retaliation for Muslim suffering, particularly in Palestine presenting these actions as integral to the continuation of the global jihad movement.

Although fighting between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government has decreased, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping have surged, partly linked to the Israel-Hamas conflict. While Saudi-Houthi talks and Iranian-Saudi normalization offer some hope, peace efforts remain slow and violent. The situation is further complicated by southern independence calls from the STC and a rise in AQAP attacks. Houthi strikes on Red Sea shipping have disrupted a key trade route, reducing Suez Canal traffic and forcing rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope. Major shippers avoid the area underscoring ongoing risks to global trade and maritime security.

The Islamic State’s recent territorial advances in eastern Somalia, including clashes with al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda, highlight its expanding regional presence. Through aggressive propaganda, IS is recruiting local supporters and forging complex alliances. Somalia’s proximity to critical shipping routes like Bab al-Mandab raises concerns, as extremist control could disrupt global trade. Military interventions by Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti aim to curb IS and al-Shabaab, but the escalating conflict threatens regional stability. In April 2024, IS claimed control of Puntland’s Bari region after a decisive victory over al-Shabaab, underscoring its growing influence and intensifying violence in the region.

The Sahel region is grappling with escalating security and humanitarian crises, fueled by extremist groups like Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, and Islamic State West Africa Province. These groups have capitalized on the collapse of international counterterrorism efforts and weakened regional governance to target both governments and civilians. France’s 2022 withdrawal created a power vacuum, enabling groups such as the Wagner Group to gain influence. The growing collaboration between terrorist organizations and criminal networks further destabilizes the region, with extremist violence surging—over 2,000 civilians were killed in the first half of 2022, and at least 7,800 deaths were reported in the first seven months of 2023, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED.)

Implications

The Gaza conflict and the resulting anti-Western sentiment are being strategically leveraged by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to amplify its propaganda, urging attacks on Jewish and Western targets. The involvement of Saif al-Adel’s son in AQAP leadership, coupled with the group’s intensified messaging, indicates that this campaign has the direct endorsement of al-Qaeda’s top leadership. Furthermore, the UN has identified signs of coordination between AQAP and the Houthi movement, including joint drone training efforts. These developments heighten the risk of AQAP-directed violence, particularly targeting Western interests, and warrant heightened vigilance and preparedness. This highlights the return of IS to external operations, signaling that other groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ) may also be poised to execute international attacks and rally supporters. The motivation for such actions has intensified, particularly following the October 7 Hamas attack and Israel’s military response.

Somalia’s instability poses global risks, endangering diplomatic missions, businesses, and citizens, particularly in Europe. It heightens the threat of terrorism fueled by radicalization and returning foreign fighters. Given the interconnected nature of terrorism, unrest in Somalia could have far-reaching implications, making Europe a potential target. Regional dynamics are driving jihadist growth in Somalia and across Africa. Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, highlighted by its January 2024 deal with Somaliland, combined with the Israeli war on Gaza and tensions in the Red Sea, provide fertile ground for extremist ideologies. These events fuel Somali nationalism, resistance to foreign intervention, and anti-Western sentiments, particularly in response to Western support for Israel. Additionally, growing African frustrations over colonial legacies and Western dominance further bolster jihadist propaganda, aiding recruitment and expansion in Somalia and East Africa.

Puntland’s strategic position offers ISIS significant advantages, including access to maritime routes, taxation opportunities, and financial operations. The group’s territorial gains strengthen its propaganda and recruitment, while enhancing ties with ISIS-Khorasan, expanding its global influence. ISIS’s growing activity in Puntland marks a shift in strategy after its losses in Iraq and Syria, as it seeks to bolster its operational capacity and financial networks across Africa, including in Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia. This resurgence increases the likelihood of external operations, highlighting ISIS’s renewed relevance on the global counterterrorism agenda. The group’s territorial control in Puntland undermines Somalia’s counterterrorism efforts, posing a direct threat to regional stability by facilitating piracy and fueling competition with Al-Shabab over maritime resources. This jeopardizes key trade routes and strengthens ISIS’s global funding and recruitment operations. The rising presence of foreign fighters from countries like Morocco, Syria, Sudan, and Ethiopia further exacerbates Somalia’s security challenges.

The reluctance of major shipping companies to operate in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea highlights escalating security risks from Houthi attacks and unstable regional geopolitics. Disruptions to the Suez Canal, a critical trade artery, amplify economic fallout. Shippers face tough decisions balancing risk, cost, and security challenges. While diplomacy might ease tensions and restore confidence in the Suez Canal, continued Houthi aggression or regional instability could force a shift to longer, more expensive routes like the Cape of Good Hope, impacting global trade dynamics.

The Sahel’s role as a critical migration route from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe underscores the strategic implications of escalating violence in the region. Rising insecurity is likely to lead to increased displacement and migration, placing greater strain on coastal African nations and European countries, which could further destabilize the region and complicate international migration management efforts.

The withdrawal of U.S. support for Saudi-led offensive operations against Ansar Allah in Yemen in February 2021, coupled with the persistent threat posed by the Iran-backed Yemeni militia, has fueled concerns among GCC states about a waning U.S. security commitment in the region. This shift has reinforced perceptions of a diminishing U.S. security umbrella, prompting regional players to reassess their strategic and defense postures amidst ongoing instability.

Forecast

• Al-Qaeda’s (AQAP) continued resilience, despite setbacks, suggests the possibility of high-profile attacks in southern Yemen targeting Saudi-led forces or Western interests to reaffirm its relevance. AQAP could also serve as a vehicle for broader al-Qaeda operations aimed at consolidating its global authority. The group’s increasing focus on maritime operations raises the threat to regional maritime security, amplifying risks of attacks that could disrupt vital trade routes.
• Growing tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia risk destabilizing southern Yemen’s fragile power balance. Saudi Arabia’s increased focus on the south could undermine the UAE’s influence, shifting attention away from countering AQAP. This diversion may provide AQAP with an opportunity to regroup and rebuild, especially as UAE-backed forces have been key in combating the group in the region.
• The rise in coordinated operations, such as the January 2024 ISIS suicide bombing in Iran and the March 2024 attack in Moscow, reflects the growing threat of large-scale jihadist operations with higher casualty potential. AQAP’s intensified media campaigns to inspire lone-wolf attacks, particularly by tapping into global events, will likely continue to expand its operational footprint. This strategy signals AQAP’s broader objectives of disrupting global security and asserting its relevance on the international stage.
• ISIS’s expanding alliances and recruitment, especially in Somalia, combined with its proximity to vital shipping routes like Bab al-Mandab, present a heightened threat to global trade and regional security. With escalating violence in Somalia, including ISIS’s successful campaign to control key areas, the broader Horn of Africa faces significant instability, which could disrupt maritime flows and exacerbate local conflicts.
• The conflict between ISIS and Al-Shabab in Somalia, while temporarily diverting attention from either group’s dominance, presents serious long-term risks. ISIS’s growing influence in Puntland amplifies threats to Somalia’s stability, regional security, and key maritime routes near the Gulf of Aden. This risk is compounded by internal political divisions, escalating Red Sea tensions, the resurgence of piracy, and regional rivalries, all contributing to a volatile environment that could prolong instability and empower extremist networks.

Conclusion

The rising Islamic extremism in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding regions poses a significant and growing threat to global security, regional stability, and economic interests. Groups like AQAP and ISIS are leveraging the shifting dynamics of local conflicts, geopolitical tensions, and global crises to amplify their operations, recruit supporters, and target critical infrastructure, including maritime routes and oil facilities. The escalating violence in Yemen, Somalia, and the broader Sahel region, combined with increased propaganda and strategic coordination, is not only destabilizing these areas but also threatening international trade routes such as the Suez Canal. The complex web of alliances and territorial gains by extremist groups underscores the urgent need for a coordinated global response to prevent further destabilization and protect both regional and global interests. As these groups adapt their tactics, including the use of drones, suicide attacks, and asymmetric warfare, the international community must enhance its counterterrorism efforts to mitigate the risks posed by these rapidly evolving threats.